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I. Introduction
A. It All Started with Princess Diana
Nearly eight-and-a-half years after the fatal accident,1 the three
paparazzi who aggressively sought photographs of Princess Diana's
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2007;
Cornell University, B.A., 2004.
last moments have been punished A French appellate court issued
"a symbolic fine of one euro" for invasion of privacy.3 The court also
ordered the photographers to pay for the publication of
announcements about their convictions in three newspapers. 4 Just one
week prior to this decision, Britney Spears commented on today's
reckless paparazzi,5 specifically invoking the late Princess of Wales: "I
mean, Princess Diana got killed by one of these people.,
6
The Princess Diana tragedy triggered an international backlash
against the paparazzi.7 On American soil, the incident resulted in a
"temporary collapse in the market for paparazzi photography and the
introduction of new privacy laws in California .... ,8 The increasing
amount of media coverage devoted to the escalating tension between
the paparazzi and celebrities in the last year, however, attests to the
resurgence of the market for celebrity images9 and the inadequacy of
California's laws to address the core of the problem.
B. Impetus Behind Revived Interest in Curbing the Paparazzi
While paparazzi "have long been a fixture in Los Angeles,"
veteran stars, publicists, and entertainment lawyers believe that
certain photographers "seem to have [recently] changed the rules of
the game.' Actress Halle Berry commented that the paparazzi
"weren't always as invasive. There was some healthy respect about
it-they kept a certain distance from you. You weren't chased at high
speeds through the streets where you endangered other lives and...
1. On August 31, 1997, Princess Diana died in Paris from injuries sustained when
the car in which she was traveling crashed at high speed in a narrow tunnel. PETER HOWE,
PAPARAZZI, 120 (2005).
2. Mark Ellis, Di Paparazzi Fine, THE MIRROR (Scots Edition), Feb. 23, 2006, at 8.
3. Id. France's highest court had previously dropped manslaughter and breach of
privacy charges against ten photographers including the same three who got the slap on
the wrist in this case. Id.
4. Charles Bremner, Paparazzi Convicted Over Diana Intrusion, TIMES (London),
Feb. 23, 2006, at 9.
5. Tim Cavanaugh, The Myth of the 'Stalkerazzi, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at B15
(quoting an interview with People for its February 27, 2006 issue after Spears was caught
driving with her unsecured infant on her lap). "I was terrified that this time the physically
aggressive paparazzi would put both me and my baby in danger." Id.
6. RedEye Edition, Camera Shy, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 17, 2006, at 64.
7. HOWE, supra note 1 at 120.
8. Id. at 123.
9. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
10. David Halbfinger & Alison Hope Weiner, As Paparazzi Push Harder, Stars Try
to Push Back, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,2005, at Al.
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innocent people . . . .," Today, described by the press and law
enforcement as "overly aggressive" and "dangerous," 12 members of
the paparazzi have begun to employ tactics such as surrounding
celebrities and preventing them from moving in any direction or
getting to their cars, boxing in their cars with the cars of paparazzi,
and even striking a celebrity's car after chasing her into a dead end
street.13 The paparazzi, often in packs, engage in such conduct "in
order to either capture the victim's reaction to the assault on film or
tape, or to use the threat of assault to impede the mobility of the
celebrity so that an image may be taken."'4 Insiders say this
''escalating war of wheels between A-list stars and the roving
photographers who dog them" makes Los Angeles ripe for a Princess
Diana tragedy."
Today, the work of the paparazzi appears in even the most
mainstream publications. 6 It is difficult to distinguish a paparazzo 7
from his traditional photojournalist counterparts, although an excerpt
from Peter Howe's Paparazzi18 captures the essence of the difference:
"In short, it's taking photographs you shouldn't take in places you
shouldn't be. . .. [T]heir true calling requires more cunning,
resourcefulness, creativity, and sheer nerve than a red carpet ever
demanded."' 9 The problem emerges when these attributes translate
into aggressive tactics placing the welfare of not only the paparazzi in
11. Id.
12. Civil Assault: Liability: Hearing on AB 381 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, 2005-2006 Sess. 3 (Cal. 2005), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab 381 cfa_20050908_094509_asm comm.html.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Michelle Caruso, Photogs Wage War of Wheels, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 21,
2005, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/story/339133p-289651c.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2006).
16. HOWE, supra note 1, at 135. "Street photographers do what the paparazzi do, but
they don't take it to such extremes." Id. at 29.
17. Italian Director Federico Fellini coined the term "paparazzo" for one of his
characters in his 1960 film La Dolce Vita. Camrin L. Crisci, All the World is Not a Stage:
Finding a Right to Privacy in Existing and Proposed Legislation, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 207, 207 (2002) ("Fellini's depiction of the invasive tactics of Paparazzo...
came to represent the photojournalists who hunt celebrities for their pictures.").
18. Howe spent two years researching and interviewing the paparazzi as the basis for
understanding the profession. Gina Piccalo, Caught in Their Sights; Savvy and Chutzpah
Pay Off For Paparazzi, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2005, at El. He has served as Picture Editor
for N. Y. Times Magazine and is a regular contributor to USA Today, American Photo, and
other publications. HOWE, supra note 1.
19. Id. at 17-18.
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jeopardy, but also the safety of their Hollywood targets and the public
at large .
Although several celebrities have recently garnered media
attention as a result of their altercations with the paparazzi, the
vehicular assault committed against Lindsay Lohan in May, 2005
"signaled a turning point in the trumped-up war against
'stalkarazzi. ,,21
The young actress sped away from the pursuit of the paparazzi,
only to come to a dead end. When she made a U-turn in order to
escape the parade of paparazzi, one their number intentionally
crashed his car, into hers, causing her to come to a stop. The
incident was captured on film by the rest of the [paparazzi], and
pictures of the incident were soon published in many different
publications. 22
While these incidents may give rise to criminal charges "due to the
egregious nature of the assault, many go unpunished due to the
difficulty of proving criminal assault., 23 Although the paparazzo who
assaulted Lindsay Lohan was arrested for suspicion of felony stalking
and assault with a deadly weapon, no criminal charges were brought
against him.24 The Los Angeles District Attorney's office concluded
that there was insufficient evidence that the paparazzo intentionally
struck her car: "it appears that, although the suspect was most likely
20. A celebrity pursuit involving the actress Scarlet Johansson serves as an example
of how easily and incidentally bystanders can get swept up in a celebrity-paparazzi
conflict. In August, 2005, paparazzi in four vehicles pursued Johansson into a parking lot
at Disneyland. In an attempt to evade the paparazzi, she clipped another car carrying a
woman and her children. The four vehicles "then surrounded hers, with the photographers
jumping out of the cars, cameras ready." Pamela McClintock, Governator Snaps Back at
Paparazzi, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 3, 2005, at 1. Fortunately, this time, neither the woman
nor her children were injured. Id.
For the purposes of this note, the distinction between paparazzi and other
photojournalists is irrelevant. All photographers engaging in overly aggressive conduct
pose the same dangers and should be subject to the same liability since it is the process by
which the pictures are captured, not the content of the pictures themselves, at issue.
However, for the purpose of clarity, and in light of current events and the California
legislature's specific aim to curb inappropriate paparazzi conduct, this note will focus on
the "paparazzi" as such, since the hyper-aggressive, dangerous pursuits posing a public
safety risk are most commonly associated with this subset of photographers.
21. Cavanaugh, supra note 5.
22. Civil Assault: Liability: Hearing on AB 381 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, supra note 12, at 4 (crediting Lohan's accident as the incident that prompted the
California legislature to take action).
23. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that "[tihe First Amendment has never
been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during the
course of newsgathering." Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
24. Richard Winton, Paparazzo Will Not Face Charges in Lohan Crash, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 2005, at B1.
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driving carelessly when he collided with the victim's car, it was not an
intentional assault.,
25
The financial rewards of capturing the perfect celebrity photo
serve as an incentive for the paparazzi to continue to push this trend.26
Janice Min, editor of US Weekly, acknowledged that "the market for
photos of stars' unguarded moments might have eroded Los
Angeles's status as a safe haven., 27 The reality is that in today's pop-
driven culture, "[i]n a seller's market, the price tag on an exclusive
shot of an A-list personality seems almost without limit."28 A single
shot may sell from $6,000 to $100,000.29 Such price tags play a large
part in setting the industry standards as to acceptable conduct; as one
reporter writes, "independent paparazzi can earn $1 million a year
because of their unparalled tenacity and, many would say, untethered
moral code."3 ° Competition among paparazzi to capture the perfect
shot and reap the financial rewards further aggravates the problem.
"[T]he circle of paparazzi working in [Los Angeles] has increased in
10 years from a handful of photographers to scores of them. There
are dozens of paparazzo agencies.. . vying for images of about 50 A-
listers, [making] it difficult . . . to land the high-value exclusive
photos.""
C. California's Most Recent Attempt to Rein in the Paparazzi: A Baby
Step in the Right Direction
Aware of these changes, alarmed by the increasing trend of the
use of assault-and-intimidation-style tactics by the paparazzi,32 and
with the perennial war between celebrities and the paparazzi showing
no sign of ceasefire, the California legislature stepped in and armed
Hollywood with a weapon to fight back by amending its existing anti-
25. Lawrence Van Gelder, No Charges in Lohan Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2005, at
E3.
26. But see HOWE, supra note 1, at 44 (arguing "it's too simplistic to assume that the
only motivation for enduring a life of abuse, disrespect, and sometimes physical aggression
is financial. Some ... are fascinated by and in love with the craft of photography.... For
younger photographers, there's excitement and glamour in a job that allows them a high
degree of independence and moves them beyond the constraints of a nine-to-five job.").
27. Halbfinger & Weiner, supra note 10.
28. HOWE, supra note 1, at 32.
29. Civil Assault: Liability: Hearing on AB 381 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, supra note 12, at 4.
30. Piccalo, supra note 18.
31. Id.
32. Civil Assault: Liability: Hearing on AB 381 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, supra note 12, at 4.
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paparazzi statute.33 Effective January 1, 2006, the amendment allows
victims of paparazzi assaults to file lawsuits seeking up to three times
the damages suffered, in addition to punitive damages and court
orders requiring the photographers to disgorge any proceeds earned
from the pictures involved.2M Unfortunately, however, it is unlikely
that this weapon will be as powerful as the legislature anticipated.
With the rise of reckless and aggressive tactics, high-speed
pursuits jeopardizing public safety, and other extreme measures to
capture the perfect celebrity snapshot, the California legislature, for
good cause, determined that its existing anti-paparazzi statutory
remedies fell short. While the statute greatly enhanced the penalties
from those under the traditional common law remedies for invasion
of privacy, the narrow language of the physical and constructive
trespass provisions of the anti-paparazzi statute critically limits the
effectiveness of the law. Further, even if these remedies were
effective and utilized, they do not reach the recent paparazzi pursuits
of their celebrity prey.
Since assault protects against the apprehension of immediate
physical contact,35 the legislature seems to be at least moving toward
the core problem with its 2005 amendment to California Civil Code
section 1708.8. Celebrities certainly have a right to live in society
without being put in fear of physical harm. Assault protects this right
of personal security, but the difficulty of proving the requisite intent
makes the amendment little more than a legislative censure of
paparazzi conduct. With the "lottery-like payoffs a single image can
produce,"36 it is clear that the paparazzi are going to need more than a
slap on the wrist for their misconduct. In order to accomplish this, the
legislature needs to counteract the increasingly aggressive and
extreme tactics of the paparazzi with a more innovative solution. An
analysis of assault followed by a brief overview of recovery available
for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress suggests
that, in order to deter paparazzi and redress celebrities, California
must discard the intent requirement and relax or abandon the
imminence requirement of assault. California should fashion a new
remedy in which the paparazzi can be held liable for negligently
causing apprehension of contact.
33. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (2006).
34. Id.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
36. Piccalo, supra note 18, at El.
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II. Background
A. Recovering for Invasion of Privacy under the Common Law: Intrusion
into Seclusion
California began developing a common law privacy tort in 1931.37
Of the four traditional common law remedies for invasion of privacy,
intrusion into seclusion is most relevant to the issue at hand.38
California has adopted the Restatement definition of the intrusion
into seclusion privacy tort: "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or
his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.""
In Shulman v. Group W Productions, the California Supreme
Court held that the intrusion cause of action has two elements: "(1)
intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter (2) in a manner
highly offensive to a reasonable person." 4 When the plaintiff has
merely been observed, or even photographed or recorded, in a public
place, the first element is not satisfied.4' Rather, "the plaintiff must
show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory
privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the
plaintiff. The tort is proven only if the plaintiff had an objectively
reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude ....,42 Further, "[i]f
the undisputed material facts show no reasonable expectation of
privacy or an insubstantial impact on privacy interests, the question of
invasion may be adjudicated as a matter of law.,
43
Even if a celebrity were to try to pigeonhole the type of reckless
paparazzi behavior at issue (taking place in locations in which he or
she could not reasonably hold an expectation of privacy) into a
common law intrusion tort cause of action, these claims would be
37. Dietemann v. Time Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1971) (citing Melvin v. Reid,
297 P. 91)).
38. Under the common law, the right of privacy is also invaded by appropriation of a
plaintiff's picture or name for defendant's commercial advantage, publication of facts
placing a plaintiff in a false light, and public disclosure of private facts. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
39. Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1482 (1986) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)).
40. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. App. Ct. 1998).
41. Id.
42. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490.
43. Sanders v. Amer. Broad. Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 543,548 (1997).
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unlikely to survive a summary judgment motion. In Deteresa v.
American Broadcasting Co., the Ninth Circuit found an "insubstantial
impact on privacy interests" based on the undisputed facts that the
plaintiff was videotaped in public view by a cameraperson in a public
place." The California Court of Appeal addressed a similar situation
in Aisenson v. American Broadcasting Co.:
Respondents' camera crew... videotaped appellant from their car,
which was parked across the street from his home. They maintain
that appellant was in full public view from the street at the time he
was videotaped. Appellant claims he could not be seen from the
photographer's location unless an enhanced lens was being used.
He does not, however, claim that his car and the driveway where he
was filmed were outside of public view. Nor has he shown that his
home address or his car license plate number were disclosed. At
most, the evidence shows that any invasion of privacy which
took place was extremely de minimus [sicJ5 because the camera crew
did not encroach on appellant's property.
Thus, in the context of the aggressive paparazzi type conduct at issue,
it is likely that courts would determine the intrusion of privacy, if any,
to be de minimus and thereby insufficient to state a common law
intrusion into seclusion privacy claim. The common law tort remedies
are not broad enough to provide relief in these circumstances.
In Sanders v. American Broadcasting Co., however, the
California Supreme Court reiterated that it has never "stated that an
expectation of privacy, in order to be reasonable for purposes of the
intrusion tort, must be of absolute or complete privacy."' "[P]rivacy,
for purposes of the intrusion tort, is not a binary, all-or-nothing
characteristic."'47 Although the tort is often defined in terms of
"seclusion,, 48 "the concept of 'seclusion' is relative. The mere fact that
a person can be seen by someone does not automatically mean that
he or she can legally be forced to be subject to being seen by
everyone. 49 In Sanders, the court stated that the facts of Dietemann °
44. Deteresa v. Amer. Broad. Co., 121 F.3d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1997).
45. Id. at 466 (citing Aisenson v. Amer. Broad. Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 146, 162-163
(1990)).
46. Sanders v. Amer. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. 1999).
47. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 72.
48. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977); Shulman, 955 P.2d
at 490.
49. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 72 (citing 1 MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY § 5.10 (1998)).
50. In Dietemann, reporters for a news magazine deceitfully gained access to a
doctor's home office, where they secretly photographed and recorded his examination of
one of them. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 246.
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exemplified the idea of a "legitimate expectation of limited privacy.""
Taking pictures of a person in a public place, or on a public street
while he or she is driving or immediately after having been in a scuffle
with the pursuing paparazzi, does not fit within this notion of a
legitimate expectation of limited privacy. For liability to attach, the
defendant must intrude into something within the plaintiff's own
private domain. When the California legislature enacted the anti-
paparazzi statute in 1998, it was justified in concluding that the
traditional common law remedies for invasion of privacy were
inadequate to redress celebrities who were aggressively and
relentlessly pursued by the paparazzi.
B. California's Original Anti-Paparazzi Statute: Invasion of Privacy by
Trespass
California enacted its anti-paparazzi statute in 1998, setting
forth the remedies afforded victims of physical52 and constructive53
trespass committed with the intent to take photographs or
recordings. The law authorizes recovery of treble and punitive
damages." Additionally, if invasion of privacy occurs for a
"commercial purpose," the statute provides for disgorgement of any
profits earned from the sale of the photographs or recordings. 6
Finally, the statute allows for equitable relief, including injunctions.
The statute also provides that a person who "directs, solicits, actually
induces, or actually causes" another person to commit an assault or
other invasion of privacy with the intent to capture a physical
impression is liable for specified damages, regardless of the existence
of an employee-employer relationship. Finally, the statute
51. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 72.
52. See § 1708.8(a).
53. See § 1708.8(b). Liability under the constructive invasion of privacy subsection
requires the "the use of a visual or auditory enhancing device" and involves
"circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id.
54. § 1708.8.
55. § 1708.8(d). Pursuant to Civil Code section 3294, "where it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the
plaintiff... may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (2006).
56. "Commercial purpose" is defined here as the "expectation of a sale, financial
gain, or other consideration." § 1708.8(k).
57. § 1708.8(h).
58. § 1708.8(e). While holding the publishers as well as the individual photographers
accountable prevents publication of the pictures in the United States, it cannot prevent
them from being printed in foreign magazines. HOWE, supra note 1, at 100. A June 2004
Ruling by the European Court of Human Rights, however, may be rapidly closing these
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specifically forecloses the defendant from making a "defense ... that
no image, recording or physical impression was captured or sold."'5 9
The legislature drafted the statute regarding physical and
constructive trespass narrowly so as to ensure that legitimate
photojournalists would not be held liable under its provisions, but in
doing so, seems to have inadvertently foreclosed any path for
celebrities to seek redress against the paparazzi under the statute.
The statute imposes liability for trespass committed for the narrowly
defined purpose of capturing an image or recording of the defendant
"engaging in a personal or familial activity." 6 The legislature
construed "personal or familial activity" to include "intimate details
of the plaintiff's personal life, interactions with the plaintiff's family
or significant others, or other aspects of plaintiff's private affairs or
concerns."' An additional requirement for the constructive trespass
provision invokes the same "reasonable expectation of privacy"
language discussed in relation to the common law intrusion tort,
thereby raising the same doubts as to its effectiveness in addressing
the numerous celebrity encounters with the paparazzi that occur on
main streets and other crowded public spaces. 62 Finally, in order to be
held liable under this statute, the defendant must commit the invasion
of privacy "in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, 63 an
element of the statute that represents a retreat from the "highly
offensive" requirement under the common law.'
III. Analysis
A. The 2005 Amendment: Adding Assault to the Anti-Paparazzi Statute
Faced with a flood of media headlines, high-speed pursuits, and
clashes between paparazzi and celebrities, the California legislature
markets for photos taken under such circumstances. Photos printed purely for
entertainment purposes rather than to advance public debate violate Article 8 of the




61. "Personal and familial activity does not include illegal or otherwise criminal
activity as delineated in subsection (f)," but does include the activities of victims of crime
in circumstances where either the subdivisions regarding constructive or physical invasion
of privacy apply. § 1708.8(1).
62. § 1708.8(b) ("under circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable
expectation of privacy").
63. §§ 1708.8(a)-(b).
64. See Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 231.
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acknowledged the fact that its statute failed to deter paparazzi and
provide effective redress for celebrities by its 2005 amendment,
adding assault to the list of activities that constitute invasion of
privacy. The law now imposes civil liability for "assault committed
with the intent to capture any type of visual image, sound recording,
or other physical impression .... ,,65 The legislature intended to
extend the current rights and remedies for victims of assault
committed by paparazzi in their attempt to capture images or sound
recordings for financial gain.66
While the amendment was being debated by the Assembly
Committee on the Judiciary, opponents voiced their concerns that the
implications of this law extend beyond the paparazzi and could have a
chilling effect on the reporting of newsworthy events and subject the
press to frivolous litigation.67 From the outset, it is important to note
that similar arguments were made back in 1998 in opposition to the
original anti-paparazzi statute.68 However, these fears seem to be
largely unfounded since, to date, there are no reported cases based on
this statute. 9
The legislature explicitly acknowledges that its statutory
remedies are not meant to displace any avenues for recovery that may
otherwise be available: "[t]he rights and remedies provided in this
section are cumulative and in addition to any other rights and
remedies provided by law."7° By doing so, it raises the question of
what, if any, relief the statute, and more specifically, the assault
provision really affords celebrities. True, it seems that with the
increasingly aggressive tactics employed by the paparazzi, assault
comes closer to addressing the core problem than either traditional
common law privacy torts or section 1708.8 as originally enacted. A
closer look at the elements of assault as an intentional tort and the
difficulty of proving the requisite intent, however, suggest that the
65. § 1708.8(c).
66. Civil Assault: Liability: Hearing on AB 381 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, supra note 12, at 3.
67. Id. at 5.
68. See Physical Invasion of Privacy: Liability: Hearing on AB 381 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 2005-2006 Sess. 5 (Cal. 2005), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/bill/asm/ab 0351-0400/ab_381cfa_20050906_111401 sen floor.html (citing the strong
opposition of the California Newspaper Publishers Association Services, Inc to the 1998
legislation, to which the organization sent a letter urging Governor Pete Wilson to veto
the Bill).
69. Judicial Council of Cal. Civil Jury Instructions, CACI No. 1800, Intrusion Into
Private Affairs (2005).
70. § 1708.8(i).
amendment is nothing more than a statement of legislative
disapproval and censure of paparazzi conduct, rather than a workable
solution to the problem.
B. Why the Amendment is Doomed to Fail: Assault as an Intentional Tort
The law imposing civil liability for assault committed with the
intent to capture a physical impression does not on its face restrict the
cause of action to victims of paparazzi assault, as opposed to the
greater news industry.' Legislative history, however, undoubtedly
suggests this is the case: the author of the amendment, California
Assemblywoman Cindy Montanez, emphasized the role of the intent
requirement in ensuring that liability extend only to the legislature's
intended targets (the paparazzi and, more specifically, those engaging
in overly aggressive and dangerous conduct). 2
Assault is an intentional tort and the actor must have intended to
inflict harmful or offensive contact upon the other person. 3 In
California, a court instructs the jury to find the requisite intent in
either of two situations: 1) when the defendant intentionally does an
act that made the plaintiff "reasonably believe" that he or she was
about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner; or 2) when the
defendant threatens to touch the plaintiff in a harmful or offensive
manner, and it "reasonably appeared" to the plaintiff that the
defendant "was about to carry out the threat. ' 74
Assault requires intentional conduct. The defendant must act
with the purpose to cause apprehension of a contact or "with
knowledge that, to a substantial certainty, such apprehension will
result."75 Absent such intent, the actor is not liable for an assault even
if his conduct "creates an unreasonable risk of causing such an
apprehension to another" and even if his conduct does, in fact, cause
such apprehension. 6 According to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, assault protects "only against acts intended to inflict a bodily
contact or to cause an apprehension of such contact, and not against
71. See § 1708.8(c).
72. Civil Assault: Liability: Hearing on AB 381 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, supra note 12, at 5.
73. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
74. Judicial Council of Cal. Civil Jury Instructions, CACI No. 1301, Assault -
Essential Factual Elements (2005).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 cmt. d (1965). Thus, the defendant may
not avoid liability by claiming that he did not mean to place the plaintiff in fear of an
unwanted touching, if he knew to a substantial certainty that fear of a touching would
result.
76. Id. at § 21 cmt. f.
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conduct which creates such a risk of it that, had the risk threatened
bodily harm, it would constitute negligence." 7  Thus, regardless of the
fact that a photographer may clearly be negligent and act in such a
manner that creates a risk of his celebrity prey apprehending bodily
contact, if he lacks the requisite intent, he will not be liable for
assault.
Many situations in which persons are placed in fear of a touching
are not intentional as that term is used in intentional tort law. While a
celebrity may clearly be traumatized by a pack of paparazzi carelessly
pursuing her down the street at high speed, she would be unlikely to
succeed in an action for assault.7" Assault addresses only one narrow
form of emotional distress: apprehension of a contact with the person
of the plaintiff.79 In all but the most extreme cases, this is not what a
paparazzo threatens to do. He does not intend to physically touch the
celebrity, nor does the celebrity actually fear that he will. Since
assault only protects against threatened contacts with the plaintiff
herself, these interactions are not assaults.
Further, there is a crucial difference between a person
apprehending an imminent injury and realizing, after the fact, that he
or she has narrowly escaped one. To succeed in a cause of action for
assault, a plaintiff must be placed in fear of an imminent contact.0 A
celebrity's post hoc awareness of contact may be equally disturbing,
but it does not qualify as assault.
Yet, the overly aggressive tactics employed by paparazzi surely
are inappropriate and celebrities ought to have a remedy for such
conduct, even if it can't be shoehorned into the elements of assault. If
it isn't assault, it must be something, or else maybe the law ought to
make it something and give it a name to deter such conduct and
provide celebrities with a civil remedy. The assault cause of action is
to arthritic too be stretched this far, as a traditional civil remedy, and
even more so with the new statutory requirement that the
photographer commit assault in order to capture images or sound
recordings for financial gain.1 As articulated by paparazzo Frank
Griffin, a leading Los Angeles photographer at celebrity photo
77. Id.
78. This problem is exemplified by the inability to find the requisite intent to
prosecute the paparazzo for assault in the Lindsay Lohan incident. See supra notes 22, 24-
25 and accompanying text.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
80. See id. at § 29 cmt. b (Imminent "does not mean immediate, in the sense of
instantaneous contact ... [but] that there will be no significant delay.").
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(c) (2006).
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agency Bauer-Griffin, "[t]o actually break this law, we would have to
put our cameras down, punch a celebrity in the face and then take
pictures of them afterwards. That is ridiculous. No one would do that
and no one would want pictures of it."'
Despite the probable ineffectiveness of California's amended
anti-paparazzi statute in curbing aggressive celebrity hunters,
California's attempt does show it is moving closer toward the core
problem by beginning to address not only privacy rights, but physical
harm and public safety concerns as well."
IV. Proposal
From the common law privacy torts to its recently amended
"anti-paparazzi" statutory remedies, California admittedly seems to
be moving closer toward the core problem. As the paparazzi turn to
more extreme and more aggressive tactics, ' however, California must
itself counter with more innovative and aggressive solutions to the
problem. The courts and the legislature should establish from the first
test case that the doors to recovery under any remedy will be closed
to all circumstances except that overly aggressive conduct by the
paparazzi that endangers the public safety in addition to the paparazzi
and their prey. It is extremely important, for constitutional reasons, to
restrict the scope of liability solely to this subset of photojournalists. 5
The intent requirement of assault itself should, in theory, served to
insulate the majority of journalists, and even legitimate paparazzi,
82. Paul Harris, LA Paparazzi Cry Foul Over 'Terminator': A Law To Protect Stars
From Being Hounded Sounds Reasonable, But Does Not Focus On the Reality of Being
Celebrity, THE OBSERVER, Jan. 8, 2006, at 9.
83. "A civil action for assault is based upon an invasion of the right of a person to live
without being put in fear of personal harm." Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 816 (Cal.
1989) (quoting Lowry v. Standard Oil Co., 146 P.2d 57, 60 (Cal. Dist. App. Ct. 1944)).
84. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
85. Although the constitutionality of California's anti-paparazzi statute has not been
challenged, several scholars and critics have opined that the free speech implications of the
law are ominous. The California Newspaper Publisher's Association opposed the
amendment, in part, because it regarded it as "an attempt to amend and expand a
constitutionally suspect law that makes those engaged in First Amendment protected
activities susceptible to special penalties for which the rest of society is exempt." Physical
Invasion of Privacy: Liability: Hearing on AB 381 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
supra note 68, at 5; see also David A Browde, Warning: Wearing Eyeglasses May Subject
You To Additional Liability and Other Foibles of Post-Diana Newsgathering - An Analysis
of California's Civil Code Section 1708.8, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 697 (2000); Richard J. Curry, Jr., Diana's Law, Celebrity and the Paparazzi: The
Continuing Search for A Solution, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 945 (2000).
But see also Sharon A. Madere, Paparazzi Legislation: Policy Arguments and Legal
Analysis in Support of Their Constitutionality, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1633 (1999).
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from liability under this statute.s6 The law should not make those
persons engaged in non-aggressive, lawful photography and
reporting, whatever the subject matter, susceptible to its penalties.
However, as shown above, the strict intent requirement of assault
makes the statute problematic in terms of holding anyone, even the
intended targets of the statute, liable under its terms.
A. A Brief Overview of Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: Suggests Negligence Must Be the Standard
Concurrently with the development of privacy law, California
decided a series of cases awarding plaintiffs relief from "unreasonable
penetrations of their mental tranquility based upon the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress." 87 According to the Ninth
Circuit, this precedent is indicative of the trend of California law to
protect interests analogous to those protected by common law privacy
torts. 8 Trying to manipulate aggressive paparazzi conduct into the
rubric of preexisting California tort law aimed at protecting
emotional distress will be as ineffective as California's past attempts,
but a brief analysis of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress suggests that while the legislature can draw from existing tort
law, it must ultimately create a cause of action specifically tailored to
these photographers engaging in this particular conduct.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) allows
recovery for acts that cause severe distress, regardless of whether a
physical threat was made.89 While liability is generally confined to
defendants exhibiting "extreme and outrageous conduct,"' in the
cases of overly aggressive and dangerous paparazzi conduct with
which the legislature seemed particularly concerned, few people
could dispute the fact that this conduct transcends all bounds of
decency tolerated by our society. A court may find the requisite
intent element in one of two ways: 1) intent on the part of the
defendant to cause the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress, or
2) recklessness as to the effect of defendant's conduct.9 A defendant
will be held liable not only for intentional conduct, but also for
86. See Civil Assault: Liability: Hearing on AB 381 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, supra note 12. See also supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
87. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 248 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 248-249.
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1965) (supporting liability for
intentional infliction of harm that does not fit the elements of traditional intentional torts).




reckless conduct.' With IIED, however, a celebrity plaintiff will
encounter the same difficultly proving the requisite intent as she
would with assault. Further, in all but the most extreme cases, a
plaintiff will be unable to show that the paparazzo's conduct rises to
the level of recklessness, as opposed to mere negligence.93 In order to
redress celebrities, California will have to hold the paparazzi liable
without requiring intentional conduct and by lowering the standard
necessary for the imposition of liability.
While negligence may be the appropriate standard, California's
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) tort is blurry, at
best, and not designed to protect plaintiffs in the majority of
paparazzi encounters. In order to recover for NIED in California, the
plaintiff must either have been in the "zone of physical danger" and
suffered at least some physical injury as a result of the emotional
trauma94 or qualify as a bystander under the guidelines articulated in
Dillon v. Legg.95 In many circumstances, this does not encompass
situations in which the plaintiff is the primary person against whom
the defendant's conduct is directly targeted. For example, if a
paparazzo pursues a celebrity in a high speed car chase in order to
capture the perfect shot, but manages to stay a fair distance away as
to keep the plaintiff outside the zone of physical danger, even though
the paparazzo might be found negligent (or even reckless), the
celebrity would be unlikely to muster an actionable claim of NIED.
B. Back to the Drawing Board: Negligently Causing Apprehension of
Contact
If California is serious about curbing aggressive and irresponsible
paparazzi, it will inevitably need to return to the drawing board and
once again amend its legislation. Instead of looking to existing
92. Acting in reckless disregard of a high probability that emotional distress will
result. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965) ("The actor's
conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally
fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know
of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an
unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.").
93. "The difference between reckless misconduct and conduct involving only such a
quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent is a difference in the degree of the
risk, but this difference of degree is so marked as to amount substantially to a difference in
kind." Id. at § 500 cmt. g.
94. Thing, 771 P.2d at 818.
95. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (allowing recovery to a mother who
suffered emotional trauma and physical injury from witnessing the infliction of death to
her child resulting from the defendant's negligence).
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common law and statutory tort remedies that, as the current state of
affairs demonstrates, have proven inadequate, California must
fashion a remedy from scratch, specifically targeted at photographers
associated with this unacceptable conduct. By narrowing the scope of
liability in this way, instead of merely coupling the traditional assault
tort with the accompanying language "with the intent to capture any
type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of
the plaintiff,"96 the legislature can simultaneously circumvent the
under-inclusive nature of the statute it faced in its 2005 amendment,
while ensuring that journalists-paparazzi or otherwise-are not
liable as long as they are pursuing their profession in a legitimate
manner.
The legislature should use the assault tort as a baseline for the
new cause of action, but discard the intent requirement and replace it
with a negligence standard. Thus, a photographer would be liable for
negligently causing apprehension of contact. Further, the legislature
should either relax or abandon the imminence requirement in order
to accommodate the conduct at issue. Under this new cause of action,
had Lindsay Lohan opted to bring civil charges against the paparazzo
who struck her car, she could have successfully recovered for her
damages despite the fact that, according to the Los Angeles District
Attorney's office, "although the suspect was most likely driving
carelessly when he collided with the victim's car, it was not an
intentional assault."97 Surely, the paparazzo's conduct would satisfy a
negligence standard and Lohan would have been in apprehension of
contact at some future point.
This new remedy would address the overly aggressive and utterly
careless conduct undertaken by the paparazzi that does not quite rise
to the level of recklessness, but surely poses an unacceptable risk to
both celebrities and society at large. By incorporating assault into its
statutory framework, the legislature acknowledged the right of
celebrities to be free from both mental and physical harm. The
California Supreme Court has stated that "[a]ssault is a tort which...
recognizes the right of the individual to peace of mind, to live without
fear of personal harm."98 Allowing recovery to victims when paparazzi
negligently cause apprehension of contact serves both of these goals.
Equally, if not more importantly, damages awarded would
provide the same financial deterrent effect as damages under an
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(c) (2006).
97. Van Gelder, supra note 25.
98. Thing, 771 P.2d 814.
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assault or invasion of privacy cause of action, without having to
manipulate the paparazzi conduct in order to fit it into the elements
of other pre-existing torts.99 In Los Angeles, where paparazzi travel in
flocks and are in constant pursuit of their A-lister prey, there is
always another paparazzo waiting to capture the perfect shot in
exchange for a hefty reward. Hitting the paparazzi with only nominal
or minimal general damages would amount to nothing more than a
slap on the wrist by the courts. With a single shot selling for anywhere
from $6,000 to $100,000,'" the California legislature was correct to
assume that the paparazzi need something more than judicial
disapproval of their conduct to provide a deterrent.
The redeeming feature of California's anti-paparazzi statute is
the enhanced penalties it provides for what are little more than
traditional common law torts in the context of capturing an image or
recording. Specifically, "[b]ecause paparazzi are paid handsomely for
their efforts and stand to profit regardless of civil liability, they may
be willing to risk civil litigation.' ' 0 ' By allowing for profit recapture,'°2
California's anti-paparazzi statute may effectively deter paparazzi by
depriving them of the fruits of their aggressive and intrusive
conduct.' 3
While the paparazzi risk getting hit with treble and punitive
damages, in addition to the disgorgement of profits earned from their
photographs,"° the costs and burdens on California's judicial system
from allowing for celebrities to recover should be minimal. As with
any new law, the first time a frivolous lawsuit is filed in this context,
the court can set precedent and thereby dissuade others from using
this as a tool to bring false claims, while limiting the confines of the
plaintiff class to embody the same general intent of the legislature as
spelled out in the history of section 1708.8.5 Peter Howe believes
99. California Assemblywoman Cindy Montanez expressed that the amendment was
concerned more with public safety than with crafting special protections for celebrities:
"[w]hen paparazzi engage in reckless behavior on the streets and sidewalks of L.A.-or
anywhere-it puts everyone in harm's way: the movie star and the movie-goer alike."
Schwarzenegger Signs Law Limiting Paparazzi Pursuits, CITY NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 30,
2005.
100. Civil Assault: Liability: Hearing on AB 381 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, supra note 12, at 4.
101. Crisci, supra note 17, at 235.
102. See § 1708.8(d).
103. Crisci, supra note 17, at 235-236.
104. See § 1708.8(d).
105. See Civil Assault: Liability: Hearing on AB 381 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, supra note 12.
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"[i]t is unlikely that celebrity magazines will put up much of a fight if
courts... issue adverse rulings."' 6 Barry Levine, assistant executive
editor of The National Enquirer,'7 stated that the tabloid will be as
competitive and aggressive as any other publication in the pursuit of
celebrity coverage, but not to the point where it risks having its
reporters sued or jailed: "[a]t the end of the day, we're talking about
celebrity coverage, we're not talking about a cure for cancer."1 8
Contrary to premature concerns regarding baseless lawsuits, a
greater problem might be getting the celebrities themselves to initiate
civil lawsuits following their altercations with the paparazzi. While
criminal prosecution is still a viable alternative in appropriate
situations, the legislature's specific desire to deter the paparazzi
through the threat of large general and punitive damages can only be
accomplished in a civil context. One prominent entertainment lawyer
believes "most celebrities shrink from filing suit because litigation
allows defense lawyers to put stars' private lives on display."' 9
Further, some paparazzi disguise themselves with hats and sunglasses
and cover or remove their cars' license plates, "tactics that can
prevent a positive identification.' ' . Finally, even if identification is
possible, some celebrities may view the process of hauling a
paparazzo into court as futile, since the photographer may or may not
actually appear in court to defend himself.' Nevertheless, if and
when California does choose to provide the stars with an effective
vehicle to recover, this will certainly boost any incentive they may
have to expend the energy, costs, and time associated with litigation.
106. HOWE, supra note 1, at 100.
107. Barry Levine also serves as the publication's New York bureau chief and has
served in various roles at the Star, A Current Affair, and Extra!. HOWE, supra note 1, at
12.
108. HOWE, supra note 1, at 100.
109. Entertainment Lawyer John H. Lavely, who won a restraining order in 2004
against the photographer who attempted to run Justin Timberlake off the road.
Halbfinger & Weiner, supra note 10.
110. Id.
111. It is important to note that the difficulty of compelling paparazzi to appear in
court is not eliminated in the criminal context. For example, although the paparazzo who
was arrested stemming from his efforts to photograph actress Reese Witherspoon and her
children at Disney's California Adventure theme park was charged with child
endangerment and battery, the paparazzo failed to appear in court to face the charges.
Richard Winton, Paparazzo Fails to Come to Court, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006, at B3. He
held both U.S. and British Honduras passports and had used a dozen aliases over the
years.
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V. Conclusion
In light of the escalating use of aggressive intimidation-style
tactics by the paparazzi, and due to the fact that few cases of
paparazzi harassment rise to the level of criminal activity, the state
certainly has a legitimate interest in providing celebrities with a civil
remedy in order to curtail this conduct. The extreme measures
undertaken to reap the financial benefits of capturing the perfect
image pose a public safety hazard, endangering the celebrities or
innocent third parties who could be seriously injured or even killed in
such situations. The new legislation represents California's attempt to
curb the overly aggressive tactics employed by the paparazzi in their
zealous pursuit to feed the public's seemingly insatiable interest in
Hollywood's elite-at any price.
As for the ultimate effectiveness of any current or future
legislative action at accomplishing its intended purpose of curbing the
overly aggressive tactics of the paparazzi, only time will tell. As long
as tabloids are willing to shell out hundreds of thousands of dollars
for the "perfect" shot, it is possible the legislature will never be
capable of reining in the paparazzi. Yet perhaps the threat of
enhanced penalties and disgorgement of profits may provide a
financial incentive of its own. The drafter of California's 2005
amendment stressed that the virtue of the law is that it "hits the
paparazzi where it hurts-the wallet. Money is their motivation. So
taking away their money will be the solution."11 2 While admittedly this
attempts to reduce a complex problem into a simple formulaic
solution, the underlying logic of Assemblywoman Cindy Montanez's
argument seems undeniable. California was on the right track in
terms of the remedies it was willing to afford wronged celebrities; it
simply took a detour in terms of finding a successful mode for a
celebrity to effectuate those remedies. Discarding the intent
requirement of assault and replacing it with a negligence standard in
which the apprehension of contact need not be imminent might prove
to be what California has been searching for in order to accomplish its
dual purpose of deterrence and providing recovery in appropriate
circumstances.
Princess Diana's death remains a "cautionary tale about
photographers gone wild."" 3 While the three paparazzi who took
pictures of her as she lay dying were recently found liable for invading
112. CITY NEWS SERVICE, supra note 99.
113. Cavanaugh, supra note 5.
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her privacy, 14 the millions of pounds spent pursuing them through the
courts to recover one euro seems an empty victory for public figures
and celebrities in their perennial battle against the paparazzi."5
Driven by the universal dollar sign, the paparazzi are unlikely to take
notice of such a ruling, let alone be persuaded to change their conduct
as a result of it.
Back on American soil, while a spokesperson for the California
Newspaper Publishers Association criticized California's new law as
"attempt[ing] to stop paparazzi conduct with a very broad brush,' 16
closer scrutiny of the history of the common law privacy torts and the
anti-paparazzi statute suggests that the legislature, while admittedly
moving closer to the core problem, has only dipped the tip of its brush
and needs to approach the canvas from a different angle. Otherwise,
with the rise of dangerous and overly aggressive tactics employed by
the paparazzi in their persistent, price-tag driven pursuit of the
perfect shot, it may only be a matter of time before California
witnesses its own Princess Diana tragedy.
114. This marks "the first time anyone has ever been successfully prosecuted in France
for taking an unpublished picture." Ellis, supra note 2.
115. Id.
116. Harris, supra note 82.
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